Hardaway v. State, 7 Ga. App. 16-10-24, the state did not introduce evidence that the defendant did violence to the officer on the date in question other than by striking the officer with a motor vehicle and, as such, no due process violation occurred in the giving of the jury instructions because there was no reasonable probability that the jury convicted the defendant for obstructing the police officer in a manner not specified in the indictment. Dulcio v. State, 297 Ga. App. - Officers who attempted forcibly to resolve a civil dispute were not engaged in the lawful discharge of their official duties and did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for "obstruction" of their unauthorized actions. Carter v. State, 267 Ga. App. Wilcox v. State, 300 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975); Logan v. State, 136 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012); Taylor v. State, 319 Ga. App. - Public college's chief of police who objected to the college administration's directive that the chief of police speak with the district attorney about having the charges against a suspected laptop thief dropped reasonably believed that the chief was objecting to illegal conduct, obstruction of justice under O.C.G.A. Willful Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officers-Felony: 11/17/2019 12:50 AM: 3/8/2021: PLED GUILTY ON CHGS: 3/8/2021: Felony: Completed: 4: Willful Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officers-Felony: 11/17/2019 12:50 AM: 3/8/2021: PLED GUILTY ON CHGS: 3/8/2021: Felony: Completed: 3: Willful Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officers 16-10-24, was proper because in both the similar transaction and the incident leading to the charges being tried, the defendant was arrested in possession of cocaine and "sale-sized" baggies after seeking to avoid police; the trial court also gave an instruction that the similar transaction evidence was limited to the purpose of showing the defendant's bent of mind in committing the charged offenses. Isaac Dant, Highway 17 aggravated assault, reckless driving, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, no insurance, speeding in excess of maximum limits and registration and license requirements Defendant's conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer was supported by sufficient evidence as defendant fled when an officer first attempted to place defendant under arrest. 740, 475 S.E.2d 924 (1996); Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 656, 727 S.E.2d 257 (2012). 677, 225 S.E.2d 95 (1976); United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. He was convicted as charged on Sept. 29, 2016, following a three-day jury trial. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (2010). 866, 589 S.E.2d 631 (2003). 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); State v. Brienza, 350 Ga. App. 557, 705 S.E.2d 319 (2011). 139 (1913). - 58 Am. June 22, 2007)(Unpublished). 16-10-24(a). 16-10-24, prohibiting obstructing or hindering the police, as these statutes did not provide for a civil cause of action; furthermore, the legislature provided statutory civil remedies in the form of false arrest under O.C.G.A. Hunter v. State, 4 Ga. App. 16-10-24(a), was supported by sufficient evidence as the defendant was advised by an officer that the defendant was under arrest, whereupon the defendant resisted the officer's handcuffing attempts, ran from the officer, and failed to comply with the directive to stop. 474, 702 S.E.2d 474 (2010). Three suspects arrested in smoke shop armed robbery. Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer because the defendant jumped on the officer's back and began choking the officer after the officer, in an effort to avoid being hit, took the defendant's son to the ground and placed a hand on the back of the son's neck; and, as the officer released the son and secured the defendant, the defendant struck the officer twice in the face and once in the neck. Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 51-1-6 for the declarant's alleged violation of the criminal statutes O.C.G.A. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011). - Because the defendant was neither indicted nor tried for felony obstruction of justice, the court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge that an accomplice was the one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or an accessory before the fact; moreover, the court's own charge, which included pattern charges on parties to a crime, knowledge, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and mere association with others committing a crime, substantially covered the same legal principles as the requested charge. 576, 583 S.E.2d 243 (2003). 482, 669 S.E.2d 477 (2008). 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009). When defendant gave false identifying information to officers after a traffic stop, the defendant provided the officers with probable cause for arrest; it followed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. 16-10-24(b), and because the two defined crimes did not address the same criminal conduct, there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime and the rule of lenity did not apply. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 396 (Ga. 2015). Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. However, once the vehicle was lawfully stopped, the officer was allowed to ask for the driver's consent to search the car and no additional probable cause or articulable suspicion was required to simply ask the question and therefore defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer under O.C.G.A. of Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 249, 635 S.E.2d 853 (2006). WebThe crime of Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer is defined under state law as when a person "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 73, 498 S.E.2d 552 (1998). You can explore additional available newsletters here. 16-10-24(a), where defendant struck the officer after the officer grabbed defendant's grandson's hand; the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties, as the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the grandson had a marijuana cigarette in the grandson's hand. Carlos Jermaine Evans Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon, Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officer. 16-10-24(a) if done by an adult; an officer witnessed the defendant behaving in a threatening manner toward a vice principal, who asked the officers to arrest the defendant, and the defendant refused to permit handcuffing by a single officer, requiring the assistance of a second officer. WebArticle 2 - OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED OFFENSES 16-10-24 - Obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers. Civil rights claims are an important part of our legal system, providing a balance between the duty of law enforcement to uphold the laws, and the rights of individuals to be free from police misconduct. Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. Lee v. State, 347 Ga. App. Attempted obstruction of justice is also a crime. 16-10-24, the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request to charge on the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct. 1001 requires that the false statement, concealment or cover up be "knowingly and willfully" done, which means that "The statement must have been made with an intent to deceive, a design to induce belief in the falsity or to mislead, but 1001 does not require an intent to defraud -- that is, the intent to deprive 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998). The charge as a whole adequately covered the principle of law and allowed the defendant to argue that the defendant should have been acquitted because the state proved only disagreement or remonstrance. 35, 684 S.E.2d 108 (2009). 156, 545 S.E.2d 312 (2001). 16-10-24(a) as the officer was in the lawful discharge of official duties when the officer asked the juvenile to stop in order to investigate the possibility of truancy pursuant to O.C.G.A. You're all set! Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga. App. Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon a first conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years. 1345 (1992). denied, No. Although the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant stalked the victim and obstructed an officer by fleeing in violation of O.C.G.A. 1983. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied as the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two misdemeanor counts of obstructing a law enforcement officer because there was ample testimony about the existence and purpose of the order pursuant to which they assisted the deputies in taking the defendant into custody for transport to a mental health facility; the defendant refused to comply with the officers' verbal commands, and began fighting with the officers when the officers tried to detain the defendant; the defendant hit, kicked, and scratched the officers; and the officers and the defendant fell to the ground, and the defendant continued fighting until the officers were able to gain control of the defendant. WebOverview, and CRS Rept. Alex v. State, 220 Ga. App. City ordinance regarding resisting arrest is null and void since offense was addressed by former Code 1933, 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. 16-10-24 (a) describes the elements of misdemeanor obstruction of a Share this entry denied, No. An officer testified that if the officer determined, after completing the officer's consent frisk, that the defendant had no weapons, the defendant was free to leave. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. denied, 201 Ga. App. 811, 714 S.E.2d 410 (2011). 843.06. 218, 507 S.E.2d 13 (1998); Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. Griffin v. State, 281 Ga. App. Essential element of offense is that officer be engaged in lawful discharge of official duties. Obstruction of a law enforcement officer is a common charge associated with DUI and drug possession cases. It often results from people giving a false name, resisting arrest, or running from the police. Another way is if an officer signals you to pull over and you do not pull over immediately. Web843.025 Depriving officer of means of protection or communication. Verbal threats of force or violence can obstruct an officer and authorize a felony conviction under O.C.G.A. - Because the defendant decided to pursue an "all or nothing" defense, the trial court did not err in making the decision to not charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction, sua sponte, as such would have undermined that defense. The jury could find that when the defendant elbowed the chief in the course of the pat-down, the defendant committed felony obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. Albers v. Ga. Bd. 74, 625 S.E.2d 485 (2005). 1988). - For article, "Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 16-10-24. 3, 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978). 908 (11th Cir. 309, 764 S.E.2d 890 (2014). 606, 565 S.E.2d 908 (2002). 16-10-24(a), and there was no error in concluding that the deputy had a duty to intervene in an unlawful arrest. 16-10-24(a) or disorderly conduct under O.C.G.A. - Construed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence that defendant sold cocaine to undercover officers was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find defendant guilty of selling a controlled substance, selling a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, and resisting arrest. 693, 727 S.E.2d 516 (2012). 54, 413 S.E.2d 232 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 2d 344 (1993). 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). Woodward v. Gray, 241 Ga. App. Accusation must disclose official character of officer. 509, 411 S.E.2d 552 (1991); Hendrix v. State, 202 Ga. App. "; in subsection (b), in the first sentence, inserted "jailer," near the beginning, substituted "person shall be guilty" for "person is guilty" in the middle, inserted "a first" and inserted "year" near the end, and added the second and third sentences; and added subsections (c) and (d). 352, 373 S.E.2d 58 (1988). - When a deputy testified that the defendant resisted the deputy's efforts to break up a prison fight, then turned on the deputy, punched the deputy, and swung at the deputy repeatedly, injuring the deputy, there was sufficient evidence of mutiny in a penal institution and felony obstruction of an officer; the trial court was authorized under O.C.G.A. 467, 480 S.E.2d 911 (1997). As the jury was entitled to find that the defendant's refusal to obey the officer's commands hindered or obstructed the officer, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer. 51-7-40. Hughes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 771, 655 S.E.2d 244 (2007), cert. 16-10-24. 668, 538 S.E.2d 759 (2000); Shaw v. State, 247 Ga. App. 276, 480 S.E.2d 291 (1997). - Defense counsel was not deficient for failing to object to an officer's testimony that while violently resisting arrest, the defendant repeatedly screamed, "I'm not going back to jail," as evidence of these statements demonstrated the defendant's intent to commit the crimes of obstructing and hindering law enforcement officers, and were not rendered inadmissible merely because the statements incidentally put the defendant's character at issue. Frequan Ladez Dison, 724 Fifth St. When officers arrested a defendant after responding to a report that a person resembling the subject of a "be on the lookout for" (BOLO) flyer had been in a bank, suppression was not warranted because when the defendant actively struggled with the officers, the officers acquired probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction under O.C.G.A. Strobhert v. State, 241 Ga. App. Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer based on the evidence that showed that the defendant failed to follow the officer's instructions in that the defendant refused to exit the truck when told to do so; the defendant locked the door, rolled up the window and indicated calling9-1-1; and, after the officers pulled the defendant out of the truck, the defendant struggled with the officers, refused to be handcuffed, and tried to get up from the ground. - Defendant officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because the officer had no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. As a result, the police were justified in frisking the defendant for safety reasons and the contraband was, therefore, legally obtained from the defendant. - Accusation charging defendant with "knowingly and wilfully [obstructing] officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties as a law enforcement officer in violation of [this section]" sufficiently apprised the defendant of the acts of which defendant was accused. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. Ga. 1991), cited below, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. Tate v. State, 278 Ga. App. Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by knowingly and willfully throwing, projecting, or expelling human or animal blood, urine, feces, vomitus, or seminal fluid on or at such individual shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years. WebObstructing a law enforcement officer such as a police officer is a gross misdemeanor in Washington State, punishable by up to 364 days behind bars and/or a maximum $5,000 fine. 346, 606 S.E.2d 869 (2004), overruled on other grounds, Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 684, 813 S.E.2d 438 (2018), cert. Dukes v. State, 275 Ga. App. - Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for malice murder, burglary, and hindering a police officer because the defendant was at the back door of the mother's home without authorization, and fled when an officer tried to handcuff the defendant, the defendant's mother was found dead from massive head injuries, and the mother's rings, a lawn mower blade, and a hatchet were found on the defendant's person or stashed in bags outside the home. 137, 648 S.E.2d 699 (2007). Upon a third or subsequent conviction for a violation of this subsection, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years nor more than 15 years. Get free summaries of new opinions delivered to your inbox! 645, 458 S.E.2d 675 (1995); Imperial v. State, 218 Ga. App. 232, 561 S.E.2d 879 (2002). Moccia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008). 2243 (c), 2244 (a) (6) Sexual Abuse of Individuals in Custody. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 796, 476 S.E.2d 18 (1996). 156, 427 S.E.2d 532 (1993). United States v. Akinlade, F.3d (11th Cir. 771, 655 S.E.2d 244 (2007), cert. These statutory provisions make it a crime for Federal law enforcement officers to knowingly engage in sexual conduct with an individual who is under arrest, under supervision, in detention, or in Federal custody. Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. Evidence was sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency based on obstruction of a law enforcement officer; the juvenile defendant's claim that an officer had not ordered the defendant to halt before the defendant ran off was contradicted by the officer's testimony; flight, or attempted flight, after a command to halt constituted obstruction of an officer. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. Weba tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more people assembled of their own authority inciting a riot the use of words or other means to intentionally provoke a riot lynching the taking, by means of riot, of any person from the lawful custody of Therefore, the defendant was not justified in elbowing the officer and resisting arrest. Taylor v. State, 231 Ga. App. Merenda v. Tabor, F. Supp. 16-7-24, for which defendant was convicted; a comparison of these two offenses shows that they have entirely different elements and require proof of entirely different facts. 154, 395 S.E.2d 399 (1990). Libri v. State, 346 Ga. App. Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. App. Defenses for Obstruction of Justice in Atlanta Georgia From Yeargan & Kert, LLC